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Abstract: Fulfilling the promise of
the genetic revolution requires the
analysis of large datasets contain-
ing information from thousands to
millions of participants. However,
sharing human genomic data re-
quires protecting subjects from
potential harm. Current models rely
on de-identification techniques in
which privacy versus data utility
becomes a zero-sum game. In-
stead, we propose the use of
trust-enabling techniques to create
a solution in which researchers and
participants both win. To do so we
introduce three principles that fa-
cilitate trust in genetic research and
outline one possible framework
built upon those principles. Our
hope is that such trust-centric
frameworks provide a sustainable
solution that reconciles genetic
privacy with data sharing and
facilitates genetic research.
Introduction: The Rise and Fall
of De-identification
‘‘Widespread distrust…imposes a
kind of tax on all forms of economic
activity, a tax that high-trust societies
do not have to pay.’’
–Francis Fukuyama [1]
Genomic research promises substantial
societal benefits, including improving health
care as well as our understanding of human
biology, behavior, and history. To deliver on
this promise, the research and medical
communities require the active participation
of a large number of human volunteers as
well as the broad dissemination of genetic
datasets. However, there are serious con-
cerns about potential abuses of genomic
information, such as racial discrimination
and denial of services because of genetic
predispositions, or the disclosure of intimate
familial relationships such as nonpaternity
events. Contemporary data-management
discussions largely frame the value of data
versus the risks to participants as a zero-sum
game, in which one player’s gain is another’s
loss [2,3]. Instead, this manuscript proposes
a trust-based framework that will allow both
participants and researchers to benefit from
data sharing.
Current models for protecting partici-
pant data in genetic studies focus on
concealing the participants’ identities. This
focus is codified in the legal and ethical
frameworks that govern research activities
in most countries. Most data protection
regimes were designed to allow the free flow
of de-identified data while restricting the
flow of personal information. For instance,
both the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [4] and the
European Union privacy directive [5]
require either explicit subject consent or
proof of minimized risk of re-identification
before data dissemination. In Canada, the
test for whether there is a risk of identifi-
cation involves ascertaining whether there
is a ‘‘serious possibility that an individual
could be identified through the use of that
information, alone or in combination with
other available information’’ [6]. To that
end, the research community employs a
fragmented system to enforce privacy that
includes institutional review boards (IRBs),
ad hoc data access committees (DACs), and
a range of privacy and security practices
such as the HIPAA Safe Harbor [7].
The current approach of concealing
identities while relying on standard data
security controls suffers from several
critical shortcomings (Box 1). First, stan-
dard data security controls are necessary
but not sufficient for genetic data. For
instance, access control and encryption
can ensure the security of information at
rest in the same fashion as for other
sensitive (e.g., financial) information, pro-
tecting against outsiders or unauthorized
users gaining access to data. However,
there is also a need to prevent misuse of
data by a ‘‘legitimate’’ data recipient.
Second, recent advances in re-identifica-
tion attacks, specifically against genetic
information, reduce the utility of de-
identification techniques [8,9]. Third, de-
identification does not provide individuals
with control over data—a core element of
information privacy [10].
With the growing limitations of de-
identification, the current paradigm is not
sustainable. At best, participants go through
a lengthy, cumbersome, and poorly under-
stood consent process that tries to predict
worst-case future harm. At worst, they
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receive empty promises of anonymity. Data
custodians must keep maneuvering between
the opposite demands for data utility and
privacy, relegating genetic datasets into silos
with arbitrary access rules. Funding agencies
waste resources funding studies whose data-
sets cannot be reused across and between
large patient communities because of privacy
concerns. Finally, well-intentioned research-
ers struggle to obtain genetic data from hard
to access resources. These limitations
impede serendipitous and innovative re-
search and degrade a dataset’s research
value, with published results often over-
turned because of small sample sizes [11].
Focusing on Trust Not Privacy
We propose to shift from the zero-sum
game of data privacy versus data utility to
a framework that builds and maintains
trust between participants and researchers.
We suggest the following key principles for
trust-enabling frameworks:
1. Transparency creates trust: Trust
requires transparency between parties.
In genomic research, transparency
means informing participants about
not only the intended but also the
actual use of data. This is a commonly
accepted principle of information pri-
vacy that is found in most data
protection statutes (e.g., Canada’s Per-
sonal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act [PIPEDA]
[12]) and fair information practices
(e.g., the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
[OECD] Privacy Principles [13]).
2. Increased control enhances trust:
Given the uncertainties in genetic
studies, the burden of making ‘‘fully
informed’’ decisions about future data
use and harms is virtually impossible.
However, the situation improves when
the participant is given control over
future data use. Clear communication
of risks is crucial to ensure fully
informed participants, yet current con-
sent processes require participants to
make a one-time decision about future
data sharing preferences with unknown
risks. Even worse, some consent forms
include vague ‘‘legalese’’ that might be
tempting from a legal perspective but
instead fuels patients’ fears. Some
participants naturally shy away from
sharing when the terms are too broad,
while other individuals might make
decisions that are not well informed. In
addition, one-time ‘‘blanket’’ consent
does not accommodate the reality that
privacy preferences might change over
time.
3. Reciprocity maintains trust: Re-
searchers should maximize the value of
data collected from participants, sub-
ject to individual preferences. By ad-
vancing scientific knowledge, the re-
search community reciprocates and
‘‘pays back’’ the participant’s volun-
teerism. A sense of community among
participants can help bridge the gap
between societal and individual re-
wards. Mechanisms for participants to
‘‘reward’’ researchers who act appro-
priately (and ‘‘punish’’ researchers who
violate their trust) provide incentives
for ongoing win-win behavior.
If successful, a trust-centric framework
creates a system that rewards good
behavior, deters malicious behavior, and
punishes noncompliance. This stands in
stark contrast to the current system that
punishes researchers, participants, and
progress.
Bilateral Consent Framework
Building on top of the three key
principles above, we suggest a trust-
enabling framework, called the Bilateral
Consent Framework (BCF) (Table 1). This
approach is inspired by the recent move-
ment for participant-centered research
[14] and the growing success of online
peer-to-peer marketplaces such as Airbnb
or Uber that rely on trust-enabling
techniques [15]. To be clear, our proposal
is not meant to be final but rather to
provide a framework and a set of building
blocks to drive discussions among the
Box 1. The Gaps in Current Data Privacy Techniques
It may be that current technological methods for privacy protection, which
primarily consist of removing an individual’s personally identifying information
from records containing individualized genetic information, are simply outdated;
it is possible that new techniques will once more make it difficult to infer personal
information. Here, we briefly review computational schemes that theoretically
make re-identification demonstrably (and perhaps quantifiably) difficult. For a
comprehensive technical overview, please refer to [27].
In general, there are two classes of advanced privacy-preserving techniques
relevant to genetic data: cryptographic techniques and statistical techniques. The
hallmark of all of these techniques is that they provide mathematical proofs
delineating what the data recipient can and cannot infer based on the data access
given to them.
Cryptographic techniques can compute a known, shared function on encrypted
datasets from multiple parties; the computation reveals nothing about the
parties’ input data other than the function’s results. For example, a patient or her
physician holding genetic data can use such a technique to have the genetic data
interpreted by a third-party service for disease susceptibility without revealing the
actual genotypes. However, cryptographic techniques have some practical
limitations. For instance, they require predefined analysis protocols. Research
protocols are rarely fixed in advance. Most research is exploratory in nature and is
characterized by ad hoc analyses in which researchers test and refine their
analytic procedures repeatedly during the course of the study. Moreover, the final
output of cryptographic techniques has to be decrypted to be useful. Thus, while
these techniques enable secure computation of the raw data, the final product is
still vulnerable to certain attacks and its broad dissemination can create privacy
concerns.
Statistical techniques work by adding noise to the disseminated data. The
premise of these methods is that in some scenarios the amount of noise needed
to conceal the identity of individuals in the dataset is quite small and still permits
accurate detection of general phenomena in the data. Unfortunately, in
genomics, the current levels of noise required to reduce privacy risks appear to
be unacceptable because of the richness of the information and the uniqueness
of one’s genome. Empirical tests showed that these techniques can eradicate the
weak association signals that are the reality of most complex traits.
Our conclusion is that these emerging computational techniques for ensuring
genetic privacy show potential but would require substantial theoretical and
practical development to be fully operational methods for data sharing to
accelerate scientific studies.
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community. The major building blocks of
the BCF are introduced in the following
subsections.
Trusted mediator
The role of the trusted mediator is to
operate the BCF. This entity can be any
organization that (1) is trusted by the
participants and (2) has the means to
operate the BCF. It could be a patient
advocacy group (e.g., National Breast
Cancer Coalition), a funding agency (e.g.,
National Center for Biotechnology Infor-
mation [NCBI]), a genome center (e.g.,
New York Genome Center or the Broad
Institute), a scientific society (e.g., Ameri-
can Society of Human Genetics), or a
private company (e.g., Illumina or Beijing
Genomics Institute [BGI]). It should
mediate the communication between the
researchers and the participants, act upon
the participants’ decisions, and be the
single point of contact. In addition, this
entity should educate participants about
the nature of the data and describe the
benefits and risks.
Uniform code of conduct
Having researchers consent to uniform
guidelines makes it easier for participants to
grant consent to new researchers. Re-
searchers who are part of the BCF consent
to a code of conduct that affirms that
individual data will be properly handled,
including that it will be held securely and
that re-identification will not be attempted.
Thus, BCF replaces the ‘‘gatekeeper’’
approach, wherein IRBs decide who should
count as a qualified researcher on a case-
by-case basis, with a participant-centric
model, in which participants understand
the rules that researchers will follow.
Evidence for violation of the code of
conduct can result in public notice, can-
celed access, and possible legal action.
Methods for redress might include data
protection law, criminal law, or additional
contractual terms, such as indemnification
and compensation, similar to the model
suggested by Prainsack and Buyx [16].
Auditing
The BCF encourages a ‘‘trust-but-veri-
fy’’ approach. All data access should be
monitored, both to remind researchers
that their access privileges depend on trust
and to enable potential detection of
violations and enforcement of obligations.
One means of monitoring is for all analysis
activity to be executed on the trusted
mediator’s computing resources and
logged. This is different from current
access control models in which (upon
permission) the researcher analyzes the
data on his or her own computing
resources without any oversight on the
actual analysis. Importantly, we do not
expect the auditing system to be perfect or
to capture all data misuse. The primary
aim of such a system is to deter malicious
behavior. However, we envision that in
the future such systems can help to
automatically identify clear anomalies
(e.g., the analysis of short tandem repeats
on the Y-chromosome [Y-STRs] that is a
key component of surname inference [9])
or data analysis that is substantially
different from the consent. In addition,
logging and auditing promote transparen-
cy. There is growing interest in using cloud
computing for genetic analysis and moving
the computation to the data; adding an
auditing system can leverage this trend to
increase trust.
Reputation system
Reputation systems have revolutionized
online sharing marketplaces, enabling strang-
ers to trust each other with their safety (e.g., a
reckless driver in an Uber car), privacy (e.g., a
hidden camera in an Airbnb room), property
(e.g., ruining a car in RelayRides), or task
integrity (e.g., a lazy worker in Amazon
Mechanical Turk). These systems usually
consist of an initial background check by
the service mediator that grants permission
to use the service, followed by ongoing
rating of the participants. In some services,
such as Uber, when the reputation drops
below a certain threshold, the participant is
banned from using the service.
Similarly, we propose a reputation
system to facilitate researcher good con-
duct and maintain participant responsive-
ness. Such a reputation system would
reward researchers who maintain solid
records of adherence to the code of
conduct by elevating their visibility and
reputation. The researcher reputation
system can incorporate several measures,
such as the following: (a) ratings from
previous study participants, (b) the number
and impact of previously accomplished
studies, (c) recommendations from peer
researchers, (d) the reputation of the
researcher host organization, (e) auditing
system reports about the sensitivity of the
analysis, and/or (f) the researcher’s history
of returning results and raw data to
participants or publishing previous manu-
Table 1. Major differences between current data sharing frameworks and a BCF.
Attribute Current System BCF
Consent for secondary use One-time decision Dynamic
Primary data controller PI Participant
Who decides on secondary data usage? DAC or local IRB Participant
Data stewardship Not defined Trusted mediator
Code of conduct Locally determined Globally determined
Oversight Local IRB The community (participants, trusted mediator, and researchers)
Oversight mechanism Not clear Audit system
Who can punish data misconduct? Local IRB The community (participants, trusted mediator, and researchers)
Main source of reputation University or research institute The community (previous participants, trusted mediator, and
researchers): participant ratings, previous studies, peer researcher
recommendations, reputation of host organization, auditing
reports, researcher’s history of results, etc.
Cohort integrity Stable Indefinite/variable
Place of computation PI-owned equipment or PI-chosen
cloud provider
Resource-owned equipment or resource-chosen cloud provider.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001983.t001
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scripts in open-access journals. According-
ly, participants can elect to share data only
with researchers of sufficient reputation,
and the trusted entity can revoke access to
researchers with a low reputation.
The reputation system can also be
extended to include the participants. For
instance, it could summarize their contri-
bution to studies and overall participation.
Similar systems are common in online
communities that rely on volunteers, such
as Stack Overflow. Empirical research has
shown that these systems can create strong
incentives for online participants, resulting
in increased participation [17]. In the
context of the BCF, we believe that such
a system can not only increase participa-
tion but also foster the development of
long-term relationships with participants.
Dynamic participant consent
At its core, the BCF enables participants
to have dynamic control over access to
data about them. In current consent
architectures, the participant delegates
complete control over the data to the
principal investigators (PIs). Upon com-
pletion of the study, the PI typically
delegates secondary usage decisions to a
DAC or an IRB. In the BCF, data control
remains primarily tied to the source
individual. Researchers solicit their stud-
ies, describing the benefits of the study and
specifying limitations on how they use the
data. The participant can grant or deny
consent to different studies. Thus, instead
of one-time decisions about data sharing, a
BCF fosters long-term engagement by
participants, allowing researchers to solicit
participant data while simultaneously em-
powering participants to change their data
contribution as they see fit.
Previous works (e.g., [18–20]) have
discussed aspects of dynamic consent,
including concerns over the implications
of participant withdrawal. Although a full
resolution is out of scope for this overview,
we believe that many of these difficulties
can be overcome with appropriate design.
For example, one can attempt to mitigate
the impacts of withdrawal by carefully
circumscribing at which point a partici-
pant may withdraw consent. In order to
reduce the burden on participants, the
system could provide personalized opt-
out/opt-in preferences that would auto-
matically accept a study request based on
the subject of the study and reputation of
the researcher. The participant would
receive a periodic digest (e.g., weekly
email) of studies that meet her personal-
ized criteria, and if she did not opt out
within a certain time frame, her data
would be included. The trusted mediator
could ask participants to actively review
and renew their preferences every few
months and disable accounts that did not
do so.
We are not alone in our advocacy of
dynamic consent. Active research on this
topic is underway (e.g., [21,22]), and
commercial offerings like PatientsLikeMe
and 23andMe are currently using dynamic
consent models [23]. The BCF’s dynamic
consent mechanism emphasizes reciproci-
ty (also discussed in [14]) and agency,
giving participants greater information on
researchers and their studies. It envisions
data sharing and consent as a shared
process (e.g., [24]) involving iteration and
feedback.
The Path Forward
The description above describes core
architectural elements of a trust-centric
framework. While these building blocks
reinforce each other, they are not meant to
be an all-or-nothing monolithic system.
Implementations of the BCF framework in
specific contexts require decision makers
to make different choices about which
elements to include as well as the fine-
grain details of how to include them. For
example, the reputation and dynamic
consent systems will need to be tuned to
maintain participant responsiveness for
study durations and to avoid data with-
drawal from the later stages of a study.
The consent mechanism and language will
still need to accommodate and comply
with current regulatory schemes, and the
reputation system will need to be tuned to
avoid reputation bias (e.g., against early-
stage investigators).
Conclusion
Realizing a bilateral consent frame-
work will require new technologies and
hard choices. However, there is a need for
improved global standards for legal and
technical frameworks to share genomic
data. Initiatives such as the Global
Alliance for Genomics and Health [25]
and the Genetic Alliance [26] have
started the dialogue; it is our hope that
the proposed framework can act as a
starting point as stakeholders move from
discussion to practice. A bilateral consent
framework can transform fears of un-
known privacy abuse into excitement for
participating in the genetic information
revolution.
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